Tuesday, August 26, 2014

DAVID PATRICK MINEHAN (YUPPIE)

former NSW police officer

3.28 Minehan joined NSW Police in 1984. He became a designated Detective in 1990. He was attached to the AHU within MCSN from approximately 1991n until 1996. Within this Unit he worked with N1, M5, F7, O’Toole, Smith, Vicary, Dowding and King. Whilst attached to the AHU he was known by the nickname “Yuppie”.379 At the time of the hearing he was a serving member of NSW Police.

Extract from Operation Florida - GUNS SEGMENT
Action taken

DENNIS PETER O’TOOLE (MILES)

former NSW police officer 

3.30 O’Toole joined NSW Police in 1967. He achieved the rank of Sergeant in 1983, Senior Sergeant in 1993 and Inspector in 1994. He retired from NSW Police in 2001. He was attached to the Homicide Squad within MCSN from 1989 until 1994. He was never a member of the AHU within MCSN.381 He was known by the nickname “Miles”.

Extract from Operation Florida


GUNS SEGMENT - Action

10.365    O’Toole is an affected person because he is the subject of substantial
allegations that:
  • he was aware of and / or participated in the collection and retention of a stash of weapons at the offices of MCSN at Chatswood, (“the stash”);
  • he participated in the use of weapons and other items to load and / or verbal alleged offenders, (“the loads”); and
  • he was aware of the dumping of a stash of weapons into the Hawkesbury River by former and current officers of NSW Police, (“the dump”).
10.366    The Commission considers that O’Toole engaged in police misconduct: subsection 16(1)(a) of the Act.

10.376     In the circumstances the Commission is of the opinion that further consideration should not be given to the prosecution of O’Toole for any criminal offences.

10.377     O’Toole is no longer a serving police officer. Accordingly the question of taking action pursuant to subsections 97(2)(c) and (d) of the Act does not arise.


LET’S DANCE SEGMENT - Action

10.378     O’Toole is an affected person because he is the subject of the substantial allegations that all police officers from both Manly Detectives and MCSN who were involved in the arrest of A1 and P1 entered into an agreement to share money corruptly taken during Operation Let’s Dance, and that false documentation was deliberately prepared for use in the prosecution of A1 and P1.

10.379    The Commission considers that O’Toole engaged in police misconduct: subsection 16(1)(a) of the Act.

10.382     Following the public hearings in this segment and prior to the completion of this Report, NSW Police gave consideration to the preparation of a brief of evidence against O’Toole. It was determined however that there was insufficient evidence to prepare a brief against him.

10.383     In the circumstances the Commission is of the opinion that further consideration should not be given to the prosecution of O’Toole for any criminal offences.

10.384     O’Toole is no longer a serving police officer. Accordingly the question of taking action pursuant to subsections 97(2)(c) and (d) of the Act does not arise.


KING SEGMENT - Action

10.385     O’Toole is an affected person because he is the subject of the substantial a llegations:
  • that a number of police officers, and a civilian, conspired to pervert the course of justice by giving false evidence in proceedings, in the Local Court of New South Wales, arising out of King’s arrest for DUI on 25  September 1993; and
  • that O’Toole, aided and abetted by King, obtained a financial benefit by deception when he obtained an  informant reward payment in late 1997 or early 1998 based on a false application for a reward payment for an informant made by King and approved by O’Toole in October 1997.
10.386     Although he was summonsed,1679 O’Toole did not give evidence in the Commission’s hearings in this segment of Operation Florida.

10.387     The Commission considers that O’Toole engaged in police misconduct: subsection 16(1)(a) of the Act.

10.390     Following the public hearings in this segment and prior to the completion of this Report, NSW Police gave consideration to the preparation of a brief of evidence against O’Toole in relation to the following matters:
  • 1993 DUI – a brief of evidence was sent to the ODPP however the ODPP recommended that no criminal charges be laid against any of the participants.
  • Payment of registered informants - NSW Police investigated this matter and found there is insufficient evidence to consider criminal charges against O’Toole, or any other person.
10.391     In the circumstances the Commission is of the opinion that further consideration should not be given to the prosecution of O’Toole for any criminal offences.

10.392     As O’Toole is no longer a serving police officer the question of taking action pursuant to subsections 97(2)(c) and (d) of the Act does not arise.

Friday, August 23, 2013

A Formal Investigation into NSW Police Corruption


 

Report of the Police Integrity Commission 

"Report to Parliament - Operation Florida"

Volumes 1 and 2, dated June 2004

Over 500 Pages  

 

Operation Florida, a significant and long-term joint investigation, came to a conclusion during 2003-2004.


The Commission’s report found that 28 former or current officers had engaged in 43 incidents of misconduct. Six officers were convicted of criminal offences and were sentenced to terms of imprisonment.


Recommendations for changes to NSW Police procedures were made in connection with the execution of search warrants, supervision and management.

Thursday, August 22, 2013

Operation Florida Led To Operation Cobalt

 ROTTEN TO THE CORE
 
"Operation Cobalt was an investigation by the Police Integrity Commission into the activities of Detective Sergeant Christopher John Laycock (Laycock). At the commencement of the investigation Laycock was a serving member of NSW Police stationed at Burwood. He was subsequently dismissed from NSW Police on 15 November 2004.

The Commission received information in early 2004 of a suspicious relationship between Laycock and a criminal, David John Hopes (Hopes). This information was combined with intelligence held by the Commission and gave rise, in mid 2004, to the investigation codenamed Operation Cobalt ... The evidence revealed a startling level of corrupt conduct on the part of Laycock and his associates ... The conduct included extortion, theft, perverting the course of justice and unauthorised release of confidential NSW Police documents and information." ~ Executive Summary.


For further information, view: The Christopher Laycock Affair

Wednesday, November 21, 2012

OPERATION MASCOT

LEGISLATIVE COUNCIL

Wednesday 21 November 2012
 
 OPERATION MASCOT

Mr DAVID SHOEBRIDGE [11.52 p.m.]: 

In 2000 the internal affairs unit of the NSW Police Force was undertaking Operation Mascot into alleged police corruption. The NSW Police Force was working together with the NSW Crime Commission and the Police Integrity Commission under memorandums of understanding, managing a now notorious informer, who became known as M5. On 14 September 2000 Operation Mascot obtained a listening devices warrant from the Supreme Court. That application was made ex parte, which means in the absence of anyone other than the Operation Mascot officers and the judge.

Remarkably, that warrant contained the names of 114 people, when the affidavit in support put forward evidence in relation to only 66 people. In other words, 48 people—lawyers, journalists and serving police, many now senior police—had a listening device warrant issued against them, had their phones tapped and had their privacy breached by a secret police operation without any supporting evidence being put before the court. How on earth a judge let this happen has never been explained. What the NSW Police Force told the judge to obtain this warrant also has never been explained. In an internal police memorandum of 13 April 2002 then Acting Commander Burn gave an explanation as to why so many people were on the warrant but were not referred to in the affidavit.

The bizarre explanation given by Ms Burn was that many of them would come in contact with people who were legitimate targets and, therefore, may have their conversations recorded. Putting to one side the fact that this has never been accepted as a proper basis for obtaining a listening device warrant against someone, there is a fundamental factual problem with this explanation. Thirty of the people on the list were said to be legitimately included by Ms Burn because they were on the "King send-off list", that is, they would be going to the function for the send-off of former Detective Sergeant King. However, that function was held on 30 June 2000, more than two months before the warrant was issued. I have seen a statutory declaration to that effect. On the same day as Ms Burn issued her memorandum, former Commissioner Ryan was interviewed by 60 Minutes. He was asked why so many police had been included on this warrant. He said:
      ... it's in relation to an investigation that's going on through the Integrity Commission at the moment with an operative called M5. What happens is an undercover agent has a tape recorder. We must obtain a warrant for that tape recorder to be used in the presence of another person. From what I can gather, the officer was going to a function at which a lot of other people would be present.

The interviewer said, "Oh, I see." Commissioner Ryan continued:
      And therefore, he may be talking to 100 people, all of whom had to be named in the warrant.
On 30 June 2003 then Superintendent Burn was interviewed by police in an electronic interview of a suspect person [ERISP]. She was asked:
      Q6: O.K. All right, O.K. In relation to the listening device warrants, were you aware of the comments made by former Commissioner of Police Ryan on 60 Minutes, can you recall that?

      A: 60 Minutes?

      Q7: Yes, can you recall those?

      A: No.

      Q8: He states that the warrant related to a function ...

      A: O.K.

      Ql77: ... that all persons would be attending.

      A: Ah hmm.

      Q9: Have you any comment to make about that statement that he has made?

      A: I have no idea why he said it, I'd say he wasn't briefed.

      Q10: Well, is that statement true?

      A: No.

      Q11: Why would he make a statement such as that?

      A: I don't know, you'd have to ask him.

      Q12: Do you know who briefed him in relation to ...

      A: I have no idea.
This is the woman who drafted the memorandum on the same day as Commissioner Ryan's 60 Minutes interview. In 2003-04 an investigation under the name of Strike Force Emblems was undertaken in relation to Operation Mascot and its obtaining of a listening device warrant on 14 September 2000. That report was scathing of the explanation given by Ms Burn, as repeated by former Commissioner Ryan. In relation to the explanation that named persons were on a warrant, Strike Force Emblems found persons on the warrant did not attend any function during the period of the warrant or with other persons named on the warrant. They were not in a position to contact M5 or others during the periods of the subject warrants, which is confirmed by respective duty book entries. In relation to the conduct of Operation Mascot in obtaining the warrants, Strike Force Emblems found:
      It is the opinion of strike force investigators based on limited material reviewed and those persons interviewed, that there is an overwhelming inference to indicate criminal allegations in that the subject affidavit may contain false information and there has been an abuse of due process. The warrant was not in the 'spirit' of the legislation. There is certainly a large amount of doubt as to the operational activities of M5 and the legalities of how the informant was deployed. This raises serious questions impacting on the propriety of the affidavit/s.
I sought to ask Deputy Commissioner Burn questions about this in budget estimates, but the matter was deferred to obtain legal advice. Just this week the Government teamed up with the Shooters and Fishers Party to shut down any further questioning of Deputy Commissioner Burn. Ms Burn, as Deputy Commissioner, holds the second most senior rank of any police officer in this State. Instead of holding a public inquiry the Government referred the matter to the Ombudsman for inquiry—what will now be a secret hearing under new statutory secrecy provisions that the Government put on the statute book today.

This matter will not go away. Deputy Commissioner Burn owes the public an explanation for how on oath, in an explanation given to internal police investigators, she denied any knowledge of how it was that the then police commissioner had given the very explanation she provided in a memorandum to police to 60 Minutes and to the public. To date the only explanation that the public has been given about how this extraordinary warrant was obtained is that of former Commissioner Ryan. We now see that that was founded on a memorandum provided by Deputy Commissioner Burn but she denied any knowledge of it under oath which is extraordinary. [Time expired.]

Sunday, September 9, 2012

Bugging bombshell as secret files revealed

Date September 9 2012
Reporter Neil Mercer

Hundreds of pages of secret NSW police documents contain allegations of "systemic corruption and mismanagement" by some officers within the force’s internal affairs unit, the so-called "white knights".





Police report confirms 'bugging' rumours An internal report from NSW police confirms that a secretive police unit spied on more than 100 officers and may have used listening devices illegally. Neil Mercer reports.
Documents obtained by The Sun-Herald, allege some officers in Special Crime and Internal Affairs - or SCIA - falsified information to obtain listening devices, telephone intercepts and search warrants and, in one case, induced a criminal to commit perjury in front of a magistrate.
I smelt a rat … I was settling old scores  
They also show that Parliament, the public and rank-and-file police have been repeatedly misled about the reasons why one listening device warrant contained the names of 112 serving and former police and two civilians, including a journalist.

They also show that Parliament, the public and rank-and-file police have been repeatedly misled about the reasons why one listening device warrant contained the names of 112 serving and former police and two civilians, including a journalist.

Former detective inspector Malcolm Brammer (left) and former detective sergeant John Dolan in 1991. Photo: David Porter

 In that case, many officers, including the present deputy commissioner Nick Kaldas, believed they were victims of a personal "vendetta'' by officers within SCIA.

And M5 - the corrupt officer turned undercover operator who secretly taped his colleagues - agreed. He told investigators: "I was assisting, nurturing corruption." He also said: ''I smelt a rat … I was settling old scores which related to my supervising Superintendent."

The bombshell allegations are contained in long-suppressed reports of internal strike forces code-named Sibutu, Tumen and Emblems, which were established to investigate complaints made about SCIA between 1997 and 2002.

The Sun-Herald has now seen copies of all three reports, which the police hierarchy and successive governments have refused to release.

Strike Force Emblems was set up in 2003 to investigate a controversial listening-device warrant approved in September, 2000. It contained the names of 112 serving and former police and two civilians - and it was one of dozens sought by SCIA officers and the NSW Crime Commission, which were running a covert inquiry into police corruption, Operation Mascot.

But its net was so wide that it placed under surveillance dozens of honest officers, including the current deputy commissioner Nick Kaldas, Detective Inspector Wayne Hayes, Assistant Commissioner Ken Mackay, and Detective Superintendent Paul Jones.

The key player in Operation Mascot was a corrupt NSW cop, code-named M5, who wore a listening device for two and a half years and recorded hundreds of conversations with his colleagues. His home was also bugged, as was his car, his briefcase and his mobile phone.

The Emblems report says eight SCIA officers, including its then boss, Assistant Commissioner Mal Brammer, his deputy Superintendent John Dolan and then acting Inspector Cath Burn were among those investigated. Ms Burn is now Mr Kaldas's fellow deputy commissioner, and both are touted as potential commissioners. Emblems does not make any findings against any particular officer.

It says its inquiries were hampered by the refusal of the NSW Crime Commission to hand over crucial documents, including affidavits, and it therefore could not reach definitive conclusions.
Nevertheless, it found:

There were clear indications that "criminal conduct may have occurred surrounding the affidavit".
On the available evidence there was no justification for 54 serving and former police and the journalist Steve Barrett being placed on the listening-device warrant.

Previous Strike Forces Sibutu, Tumen and Operation Banks had identified "systemic corruption and mismanagement" within SCIA in relation to listening devices, telephone intercepts and search warrants. Serious adverse findings of corruption had been found against senior officers attached to SCIA.

Strike Force Emblems suspected similar "alleged corruption". It reveals M5 became disillusioned with his SCIA handlers and believed they were sending him to record conversations with honest police in a bid to settle old scores. It is believed one of those was Mr Kaldas.

It is well known in police circles that at one stage, Mr Kaldas and John Dolan had a serious disagreement. Emblems says that, about a month after that confrontation, M5 approached Mr Kaldas, who then became suspicious and reported the matter to the then deputy commissioner, Ken Moroney.
M5, who worked undercover between February 1999 and mid-2001, said: "I was sent by my supervising Superintendent to a particular person five or six times, I smelt a rat … I was settling old scores.'' He said he was uncertain of the true motives of those supervising him.
 
Mr Brammer, who left the force in mid-2002, yesterday denied any wrongdoing and strenuously denied any knowledge of a vendetta. [See separate story.]

Mr Brammer has been the subject of adverse findings in previous internal police reports, including for "untruthfulness" a "manifest conflict of interest" as well as "bias" and "a lack of fairness". One inquiry found he allegedly perverted the course of justice by improperly arranging an internal investigation against an officer.

Mr Dolan, who has also left the force, could not be reached for comment.

Mr Brammer has previously said Operation Mascot was run with the full co-operation and supervision of the Crime Commission and the Police Integrity Commission. He said the current Police Commissioner, Andrew Scipione, was involved at the time and he knew of no improper conduct by Ms Burn or anyone else.

At least one former SCIA officer has raised the "vendetta" allegation. In a formal record of interview with one of Emblems' predecessors, Strike Force Tumen, the detective Paul Albury says he thought the targeting of Mr Kaldas was based more on a "personal vendetta" rather than any evidence.

The officer says there was deep concern by some within the unit that serving and former officers were being targeted on the basis of "third and fourth-person hearsay''.

The previous Labor government and the O'Farrell government have refused to release the Emblems report, despite the current police minister, Mike Gallacher, pushing for its release while in opposition.
The Inspector of the Police Integrity Commission, David Levine, has been asked by the State Government to investigate whether the Strike Force Emblems report can be released. He is currently working his way though documents provided to him by NSW Police and the Crime Commission. It is not known when his inquiry will be completed.

Some former detectives named on the warrant believe he has not been given the resources needed to get to the bottom of the long-running saga. They believe an independent judicial inquiry is required - free of police intervention.

They say the Police Integrity Commission is disqualified from investigating the matter because it was intimately involved with SCIA and the Crime Commission in Operation Mascot from an early stage.
Strike Force Emblems interviewed 35 people who complained about their names being on the warrant. Emblems found there was no justification for 22 of those, including Mr Kaldas, being on the warrant. Overall, it found that of the 114 people named, there was probably no justification for 54 of them being on it.

"The use of 114 names on the subject listening device is an abuse of process and not in the 'spirit' of the legislation. It is not conceivable each person would be part of a conversation over a 21-day period."

(Warrants are approved for 21 days. Police need to reapply if they want to continue bugging).
Many other police named on the warrant are respected and senior detectives. The vast majority have never been told why they appeared on the warrant, let alone questioned or charged.

Emblems investigators said their inquiries were hampered because the then head of the NSW Crime Commission, Phil Bradley, after initially agreeing to co-operate, refused to hand over crucial documents. These included affidavits which were presented to the Supreme Court to support the application for the listening device.

Strike force investigators, which included five detective inspectors, clearly found themselves under intense pressure and took the extraordinary step of recording their fears that they may be subject to "payback''.

"Although there is no evidence of a 'payback' or 'reprisal', the nature of the Strike Force Emblems investigation, with the alleged corruption identified, indicates there is a potential for retribution against Strike Force members," the Emblems report said.

Investigators also reveal they were directed to be less than truthful with the 35 people who formally complained about their names being on the warrant.

It says they were "instructed" to tell complainants ''we are working towards obtaining the affidavit''.
"At no time have the complainants been informed that the affidavit has been refused or that the Crime Commission is being obstructive."

The Sun-Herald asked Mr Scipione, Ms Burn and Mr Kaldas for comment.

Through a spokesman, Mr Kaldas said he was "unable to comment".

Ms Burn did not wish to comment, except to say she had never been the commander of SCIA.

The Police Commissioner, Andrew Scipione, said: ''All matters relating to Strike Force Emblems and any associated materials have been referred to the Inspector of the Police Integrity Commission. NSW Police has provided all materials asked for by the inspector.''

I WAS CLEARED SAID MAL BREMMER

Sunday, June 17, 2012

Not even the state's top cop was immune from culture of surveillance

On the eve of the Sydney Olympics undercover police were watching many senior officers, including Peter Ryan.
Wide net ... former commissioner Peter Ryan and his then wife, Adrienne. Photo: Steve Lunam

It was Christmas, 1999, and NSW police commissioner Peter Ryan was winding down after a hectic year. With his then wife, Adrienne, he was enjoying a few drinks after work at the Marriott Hotel, a short walk from police headquarters in College Street in the city.

Unbeknown to Ryan, he and his wife were under surveillance. Not by the dark forces of organised crime, but one of his own officers, an undercover cop known as ''Joe'' who was working for Special Crime and Internal Affairs, commonly known as SCIA.

It was Christmas, 1999, and NSW police commissioner Peter Ryan was winding down after a hectic year. With his then wife, Adrienne, he was enjoying a few drinks after work at the Marriott Hotel, a short walk from police headquarters in College Street in the city.

Unbeknown to Ryan, he and his wife were under surveillance. Not by the dark forces of organised crime, but one of his own officers, an undercover cop known as ''Joe'' who was working for Special Crime and Internal Affairs, commonly known as SCIA.
"Someone was troubled because in 2002 the warrant leaked to the media."
SCIA's job? To root out corruption. It was supposed to operate to the highest ethical standards.

Undercover police officers ... known as only "Jessie" and "Joe". Photo: Brendan Esposito
The surveillance of the state's top cop had been ordered by the then head of SCIA, assistant commissioner Mal Brammer, who believed the Ryans, under the influence of alcohol, might be loose-lipped about confidential police affairs.

Clive Small
Any way you look at it, it was extraordinary. But it was not the first time SCIA, under Brammer, had been involved in highly questionable surveillance of some of the force's most senior ranks.

Earlier that year, Joe and his partner ''Jessie'' - another undercover, or ''UC'' as they are known in the trade - had spent weeks trying to gather dirt on assistant commissioner Clive Small, then head of crime agencies and in charge of squads such as homicide, armed robbery, sexual assault and fraud.

The jailed murderer and notorious crime figure Neddy Smith had alleged Small had formed an improper relationship with a Sydney organised crime figure and well-known drug trafficker, Michael Hurley, and that they were meeting at the Woolwich Pier Hotel in Hunters Hill.

Deborah Wallace. Photo: Wolter Peeters
The surveillance ran from January 22 until March 12, 1999.

It turned up three parts of, well, nothing, because neither Small nor Hurley ever appeared at the pub. As Joe and Jessie later remarked, at least the food was good. Small was never even interviewed about the allegation.

Just weeks before they started watching Small, Jessie had been tasked by her superior in SCIA with watching another officer, Detective Inspector Deborah Wallace, who at that time was working for SCIA. That operation ran from May5 to December16, 1998, and involved Jessie joining the same gym as Inspector Wallace.

Like the surveillance of the Ryans and Small, it turned up nothing. There was simply no evidence that any of them had done anything improper.

As Jessie later remarked: ''It was ridiculous. She [Wallace] was just there to do aerobics.'' Despite it lasting seven months, senior SCIA officers later said they could not recall Jessie being told to watch Wallace.
We know of these three SCIA surveillance operations, from May 1998 to early 2000, because the two undercover police involved, Joe and Jessie, later told their story to Clive Small, the man they had been told was meeting Hurley at the Woolwich Pier.

Small, now retired, and his co-author Tom Gilling revealed the extraordinary saga in their book Betrayed, published in 2010.

Remarkably, the assertion that an ''out of control'' SCIA under Brammer had put its own commissioner, among others, under surveillance did not garner any publicity in the media.

Nor was there any reaction from NSW Police headquarters or the Police Integrity Commission, which is supposed to take a keen interest in allegations of wrongdoing and improper conduct.

But all these years later, those operations have become relevant because of an aspect of another controversial SCIA investigation that did hit the headlines.
Mal Brammer. Photo: Nick Moir

It was called Operation Florida and it started in early 1999.

At its centre was a corrupt NSW police officer, code-named M5, who ''rolled over'' and, wearing a listening device, secretly recorded dozens of his colleagues to obtain evidence of corruption.

At first it was a covert operation run by police from SCIA and the secretive NSW Crime Commission.

By July 2000, Florida had gathered a large amount of evidence of serious police corruption and the Police Integrity Commission joined the still-secret investigation.

As the then boss of the PIC, Terry Griffin, told a parliamentary committee, ''Operation Florida … is a joint effort between the [Police Integrity] Commission, the NSW Police and the [NSW] Crime Commission.''

For M5 to legally record the conversations, approval for him to wear a listening device had to be sought from the NSW Supreme Court. On September14, 2000, Justice Virginia Bell approved NSW Crime Commission listening device warrant number 266 of 2000.

Nothing unusual about that, you might think. But in fact the warrant was highly unusual in that it gave approval for M5 to record conversations with no fewer than 114 serving and former police and two civilians, including a journalist.

Some of those named, about 15 or so, were undoubtedly corrupt. But many of those named on the warrant were officers with unblemished records. Among them were Nick Kaldas, now a deputy commissioner, and Bob Inkster, a distinguished detective now retired. Many others are still serving in some of the most senior positions in the NSW Police.

At the time, the names on the warrant were obviously unknown except to a handful of people within SCIA and the crime commission.

But clearly, someone with inside knowledge was troubled by what had happened, because in April 2002 the warrant leaked to the media and all hell broke loose. Many named on the warrant were senior investigators. They were furious.

A copy of the warrant found its way to journalist Steve Barrett, a crime reporter with some of the best police contacts in the country.

Barrett recalled last week how he read through the names with growing amazement, saying to himself, ''Know that one, know that one,'' until he came to a name he knew very well - his own. He complained in writing the next day to the NSW attorney-general.

Such was the outcry that Ryan, then in his last days as commissioner, went on Channel Nine's 60 Minutes.

''From what I can gather, the officer [M5] was going to a function at which a lot of people would be present and therefore he may be talking to a hundred people, all of whom had to be named in the warrant.''

Reporter: ''I see, so it wasn't aninvestigation of 110-odd individuals?''

Ryan: ''Oh no. No. If I was at that function my name would have probably been on the warrant, too.''
From the outset, nobody believed it. ''Absolute bullshit,'' was the reaction of more than one senior detective, and they had good cause to be sceptical. The date on the warrant was September 14, 2000.

September15 was the opening ceremony of the Sydney Olympics. Police leave had been cancelled. It was all hands on deck.

Further proof that the ''social function'' explanation didn't hold water emerged when another, almost identical warrant with 113 names was leaked. It was dated April 4, 2000.

Even by NSW Police standards, a social function lasting more than five months is one almighty piss-up.

According to some of those on the warrant, Ryan was misled. So who was behind the warrant?
Tim Sage, then assistant commissioner of the PIC, distanced his organisation. He told a parliamentary committee in May 2002, ''They are not integrity commission warrants.''

Asked who applied for them, he said: ''The officers of Special Crime and Internal Affairs attached to the NSW Crime Commission.''

In other words, officers under the command of Brammer, who was also in charge when the undercover cops Joe and Jessie undertook the dubious surveillance of Ryan, Small and Wallace.

While Brammer and others involved have retired, one officer has since risen in the ranks. Catherine Burn, an acting inspector in SCIA at the time the warrants were obtained, is now a deputy commissioner - along with Kaldas, whose name appeared on the warrant.

Brammer has vigorously rejected any allegation of wrongdoing. In relation to what became known as Operation Florida, he says there was oversight of him and his officers by Peter Ryan and the then head of the crime commission, Phil Bradley.

He also says the current Commissioner, Andrew Scipione, was intimately involved.

''I would also suggest on reasonable grounds Commissioner Scipione in his role as chief of staff to Commissioner Ryan and later as the Commander Special Crime and Internal Affairs had informed knowledge and more than a passing interest in the investigation and its various activities, more particularly from December 2000 when he was nominated by Commissioner Ryan as the next Commander Special Crime and Internal Affairs which he took up and exercised in April 2001,'' Brammer says.

Brammer says PIC officers also had ''day-to-day interaction with the investigators at the Crime Commission and access to information. This included examination of listening device and telephone interception documentation to ensure the product could be legally used by them.''

In regard to the controversial listening device warrants, Brammer says that ''at no time was I involved in directing, preparing or approving the affidavit or any other affidavits prepared under the auspices of the NSW Crime Commission.''

''I might also add I am not aware of any evidence or tangible allegations of impropriety on the part of any of the NSW Police officers involved in the investigation, including Deputy Commissioner Burn.''
He says any suggestion he acted improperly in regards to the issue and execution of the listening device warrant was ''false and mischievous.''

Ms Burn declined to comment, saying through a spokesman on Friday that it would be ''inappropriate'' while the Inspector of the PIC, David Levine, QC, was investigating the matter. It's not the first investigation of the controversial warrants. In April 2002, the then inspector of the PIC, Merv Finlay, QC, found the warrants were justifiably sought and complied with legislation.

But such was the outcry by so many senior and experienced police that in July 2003, Strike Force Emblems was formed to look at seven complaints about the warrant and SCIA from the Police Association. (The final Strike Force Emblems report has never been made public. Levine has been asked by the state government to see whether it should be.)

What we do know is that in a letter to the association in May 2004, Emblems investigator Detective Inspector Mark Galletta said among the complaints investigated were the:

❏ ''Impropriety regarding listening device warrant numbers 95 of 2000 dated 4 April, 2000, and number 266 … dated 14 September, 2000.

❏ ''Failure by NSW Police to process and deal with complaints relating to then Commanders, Assistant Commissioner Brammer, Detective Superintendent [John] Dolan and Superintendent [Catherine] Burn.

❏ ''Unacceptable operational risk taking - strategies concerning the deployment and management of M5.

❏''Breakdown of relations between the [crime commission] and the NSW Police.''

Strike Force Emblems was an experienced team. Of its eight staff, five were detective inspectors.
A total of 35 of those named on the warrants formally complained to Emblems and were interviewed.

While those on the warrant vented their fury, those NSW police from SCIA involved in obtaining the Florida warrant remained tight-lipped. Attached to the secretive and largely unaccountable crime commission, they invoked the commission's secrecy provisions. Nor could investigators get access to the sworn affidavits that allegedly justified the 114 names.

Inspector Galletta's letter outlined the problem. ''After protracted negotiations between the NSW Police and the NSW Crime Commission, including representations made by Ian Temby, QC, the subject affidavit and associated material has not been obtained.

''This restriction, coupled with NSW Crime Commission legislative requirements (S.29 secrecy provisions) saw investigators unable to interview police that were part of the NSWCC Florida reference.

''This included the deponents of the subject warrant and/or involved officers in the investigation.''
In other words, the NSW police from SCIA did not have to answer any questions from their colleagues in Strike Force Emblems. This appears to fly in the face of section 27 of the NSW Crime Commission Act which states that NSW police task forces attached to the commission are ''subject to the control and direction of the Commissioner of Police''.

Nevertheless, Galletta said: ''Investigators objectively concluded that there were persons whose inclusion on the subject warrants may not have been justified …''

The invoking of the secrecy provisions further enraged many of the detectives named in the warrants who saw it as further evidence of double standards: if they did something questionable they were hauled over the coals. If SCIA did the same thing, it was allowed to ''go through to the 'keeper'.''

One of the 35 who formally complained, a former detective posed this question in his complaint to Emblems: ''Have the NSW Police, NSW Crime Commission and Police Integrity Commission for their organisational, personal and collective interests knowingly and corruptly withheld their knowledge of misconduct, unethical and unlawful actions by members of SCIA?''

He also referred to yet another SCIA operation that in mid-1998 targeted alleged police corruption in the NSW town of Young.

It was called Operation Banks.

The Sydney Morning Herald reported in March 2001 that it was sparked by suspicions that some local police were involved in drug dealing with members of the Rebels outlaw motorcycle gang.

Initially hailed as a triumph, it backfired badly. The Herald reported in July 2001 that criminal charges against one man for supplying a kilogram of cannabis were dropped after ''police legal advisers revealed that Internal Affairs officers lied to Supreme Court judges to get search warrants and permission to install listening devices''.

A police officer suspended for 26 months and reinstated complained. An investigation into that complaint found affidavits supplied to Justice Hubert Bell and Justice Graeme Barr to obtain search warrants and listening devices were flawed. ''A large amount of exculpatory evidence from the source documents was omitted from the affidavits,'' the investigation found. ''This resulted in affidavits which were not balanced, and therefore misleading. In one particular area, the affidavits were false.''

In their book Betrayed, Small and Gilling reveal adverse findings were made against seven officers from SCIA involved in Banks. The NSW Director of Public Prosecutions decided not to proceed with criminal charges of perverting the course of justice against some of them.

Eight internal police investigations were launched into complaints about the operations and management of SCIA under Brammer.

As Betrayed revealed, one of them found Brammer had a ''manifest conflict of interest'' in one operation and that he allegedly perverted the course of justice by improperly arranging an internal investigation against an officer. Another quite separate inquiry into the reform process found Brammer ''was affected by bias'' and that he had shown ''a lack of fairness''.

It appears there has been scant interest from the PIC in looking at SCIA's behaviour from a ''big picture'' point of view.

Many former and serving police believe it was compromised because it worked hand in glove with Brammer and SCIA for years in Operation Florida. (The PIC's Florida inquiry, with M5 its star witness, sat in public for 78 days, heard from 99 witnesses, 32 of whom were serving officers.

Fourteen of those left the police, 11 as a result of Florida. It took evidence of wrongdoing that dated from the 1980s to 2001.)

The former officer who wrote to Emblems said: ''Prima facie, there have been numerous NSW Police investigations and inquiries into the allegations of systematic misconduct, unethical and criminal behaviour on behalf of Brammer during his command of SCIA.

''It is beyond belief that these historic and current investigations are unintentionally being isolated, treated as independent, separate or coincidental of each other.''

Relations between the police and the PIC are at a low ebb. The PIC's previous inspector, Peter Moss, QC, repeatedly criticised its investigations as being grossly unfair and biased. In some cases, evidence exculpatory to the officer being investigated had been ignored.

Levine is reviewing the recommendations of Strike Force Emblems but how far his inquiries might go is unclear.

The Police Association recently passed a motion of no confidence in the PIC and called for the Emblems report to be released.

Twelve years after the listening device warrant was obtained, old closet doors are rattling.
At least 100 cops are waiting and watching to see how far Levine is able to open them.

Sunday, May 20, 2012

MPs demand answers on police bugs

By Heath Aston Political reporter Date May 20 2012

Police Minister Mike Gallacher ... the Police Association, at its recent conference, called on the minister to order the "direct release of the report of Task Force Emblems". Photo: Max Mason-Hubers

THE inspector of the Police Integrity Commission will face questions tomorrow about why a report into a secret operation to bug more than 100 of the force's own officers has remained buried for a decade.

David Levine, QC, the inspector of PIC, will front a parliamentary committee at State Parliament and will be asked about the status of the report into Strike Force Emblems.

Emblems investigated an internal affairs operation in which a former corrupt policeman, codenamed M5, used a listening device to gather evidence against colleagues in 2000. More than 100 police officers and some civilians, including a lawyer and a journalist, were approved as targets for surveillance. But there have been questions over the legitimacy of the warrants approving M5's targets.

The Sun-Herald understands one officer on the list was already dead.

Operation Mascot, led by former internal affairs chief Mal Brammer and his assistant, Sergeant Catherine Burn, now a deputy commissioner, targeted some of the force's brightest and best.

Senior police such as Nick Kaldas - a current deputy commissioner - were on the warrants, as were the former commander of Taskforce Gain, Bob Inkster, and Mike Hagan, Brian Harding and Dennis Gilligan, now a lawyer. No one has been told why they were under surveillance.

The Police Association, at its recent conference, called on the Police Minister, Mike Gallacher, to order the ''direct release of the report of Task Force Emblems''.

Catherine Cusack, the Liberal MP who chairs the statutory committee on the Office of the Ombudsman and the PIC, said she was keen to get an answer on Emblems from Mr Devine, who has asked to take at least some of the hearing in-camera.

''We will have a lot of questions about the report,'' she said. ''For committee proceedings, the onus is always in favour of public disclosure.''

Mr Gallacher, who asked for the report to be made public while in opposition, has now referred it to Mr Levine, despite the PIC watchdog having already reviewed it in April 2002.

A spokesman for Mr Gallacher said he was committed to resolving the concerns without compromising ''sensitive police operations''. He said the government had already given the new PIC inspector powers to release reports such as Emblems.

''These powers were not available to the PIC inspector who previously examined the matter of the warrants. The minister did not think it appropriate to order the release of sensitive investigations himself. It should be properly reviewed by the appropriate authority.''

Thursday, August 25, 2011

Time and again, drug money corrupts even our finest

Date

Christine Nixon ...

In February 1992, officers in the Major Crime Squad North arrived at work to find between $50 and $200 in cash stuffed into their duty books. It had been skimmed off from more than $50,000 taken from a stash of drug money. Most took it, and the operation, Let's Dance, became the subject of hilarity.

Years later, when the Police Integrity Commission began its Operation Florida, it became less of a joke. Operation Florida found all manner of misdeeds, fabricating evidence, verballing witnesses, perjury. Ultimately, most of what it exposed came down to drugs and the money that came with them. It was said at the time that there was too much money involved when a detective, with an ordinary wage, came across big-time drug dealers who were dealing in millions of dollars. A police officer might confront a dealer carrying $30,000 in cash and two ounces of heroin. The officer takes the cash, the criminal the drug. In a narcotics industry valued at some $400 billion worldwide in 1988, corruption was inevitable.

So many, many times have I seen seemingly fine, outstanding officers come to grief. Bill Duff was a CIB detective with whom I went to Moree years ago to report a homicide case. When his name appeared in the paper arrested for conspiracy to fly in a planeload of hashish to Australia, I could not believe it. I thought: ''It must be Jim Duff, or Michael Duff, anyone but Bill!'' But it was Bill, and he lost his job in 1986, and then got himself arrested again for a drug offence.

When drug couriers Douglas and Isobel Wilson told Queensland police all about the Clark drug syndicate, they were betrayed by a corrupt officer and in April 1979 they were found murdered.

The Federal Narcotics Bureau, a supposedly elite agency set up to attack the drug menace at its highest level, did have some success, including the interception of a buddha sticks boat, Anoa, in 1978. It became so corrupted that its officers were reselling seized drugs. It provided, according to a former member, ''a good grounding in corruption''. In 1979, the Williams royal commission into drugs found the only option was to disband it.

Also in 1979, a joint federal-state task force, comprising 11 elite NSW detectives and 10 federal police officers, was formed and The Sun-Herald reported it was ''probably the most effective force against big-time drug dealing that has existed in NSW''. It, too, went bad after a drug bust on New Year's Eve, 1983, when about $180,000 was found. The plan was to skim the top off and ''divvy it up'', giving $13,000 each to some members who had been on duty that night and $1000 each to some of those who were not. That created tension. Detective Sergeant Trevor Haken, who handled the divvying-up, was called a ''lying, lashing c---'' by a senior officer who missed the big share.

In Victoria, the police established a Chemical Diversion Desk in 1995 to allow police to trace pseudoephedrine to the laboratories that made it. The problem was that the pseudoephedrine could be bought for $170 a kilogram and sold on the blackmarket for $10,000 a kilogram. The operation became so corrupted that it was, as Victoria's ombudsman later said, ''an unmitigated and foreseeable disaster''.

So Christine Nixon, soon to become the Victorian police commissioner, did what police administrators have done the world over. She revamped drug law enforcement by establishing a new, clean, accountable body. The Major Drug Investigation Division would replace the Drug Squad, which had overseen the Chemical Diversion Desk. For a time it appeared to live up to its promise. Then a member of the division and an ''informant'' were arrested for trying to steal $1.3 million worth of drugs and another police officer was charged with conspiracy.

Here in NSW, the NSW government formed the State Drug Crime Commission, later to become the State Crime Commission, in 1985, to operate separately from NSW police, secretly and efficiently.
In 1988, the NSW Police Drug Enforcement Agency was also set up under the authority of the Police Commissioner. In 1990 it smashed an international heroin trade worth $600 million involving allegedly corrupt diplomats. Once again corruption intruded. The NSW Police Royal Commission was to hear numerous allegations, involving senior officers such as Chief Superintendent Bob Lysaught, touted as a future police commissioner, whose career ended in disgrace.

Standing in the shadows, secretively and presumed to be untouchable, was the NSW State Crime Commission. At least this, it was thought, might be the ultimate untouchable. It was not to be.

Malcolm Brown has covered seven royal commissions, including the NSW Police Royal Commission from 1994 to 1997, and numerous inquiries in a 39-year reporting career.

Wednesday, November 15, 2006

PARLIAMENT OF NEW SOUTH WALES

PARLIAMENT OF NEW SOUTH WALES
Committee on the Office of the Ombudsman
and the Police Integrity Commission
PHASE TWO OF AN INQUIRY INTO SECTION 10(5) OF


 ********************************************

THE POLICE INTEGRITY COMMISSION ACT 1996
Together with Transcript of Proceedings and Minutes
Report No. 12/53 – November 2006


Transcript of Proceedings
Report No. 12/53 –November 2006 page 37

AN EXTRACT

Hon. Peter Breen
The Hon. PETER BREEN: On the issue of secrecy of the activities of the Crime Commission, it seems to me that the Commission is much more secretive than other agencies. For example, the Federal Police Commissioner, Mick Keelty, gave evidence before a Senate inquiry earlier this week. Mr Keelty said that an AFP officer had been cleared of tipping off the leaders of an alleged drug ring. 

The suggestion was that the drug ring may have been tipped off by an officer of the Crime Commission. Is that a matter that is currently under investigation in the Crime Commission?


Mr BRADLEY: I am not aware of the suggestion. Is that a suggestion made by Mr Keelty, do you say?

The Hon. PETER BREEN: It is a suggestion that is about. I am not sourcing it; it is a suggestion that is about.

Mr Bradley NSWCC
Mr BRADLEY: Perhaps in another forum the intelligence that you have could be conveyed to us and it could be made the subject of an investigation. It is not presently.

The Hon. PETER BREEN: It is not something that you are currently investigating or that you are even aware of as an allegation?

Mr BRADLEY: There is a body of material which would indicate that in the course of an investigation, which we call Mocha, there were instances of the persons of interest, to use a neutral term, being aware of investigations. The possible sources of that awareness include the New South Wales Crime Commission, because it had knowledge of the investigation, being involved in it. It also included a number of other agencies. 

Therefore, until there is a definitive answer to how those tip-offs occurred, the New South Wales Crime Commission and its personnel could not be excluded.

Wednesday, May 18, 2005

ANTHONY VASKEN MARKARIAN v THE QUEEN 2005



Address: PO Box 6309, Kingston ACT 2604 
Telephone: (02) 6270 6998 Fax: (02) 6273 3025
Email: fhamilton@hcourt.gov.au

18 May 2005

ANTHONY VASKEN MARKARIAN v THE QUEEN


The New South Wales Court of Criminal Appeal had erred in the formulation and application of sentencing principles when it dealt with Mr Markarian’s sentence for drug offences, the High Court of Australia held today. The Court remitted the matter to the CCA for further consideration.

Mr Markarian, 41, was a heroin user and Vincent Caccamo his dealer. In April 1998, Mr Markarian was jailed and by the time of his release 18 months later he had taken himself off both heroin and methadone. He resumed contact with Mr Caccamo and started taking drugs again. Mr Markarian worked as a driver for Mr Caccamo and was paid in heroin. He was still on parole when charged with knowingly taking part in the supply of a commercial quantity (415 grams) of heroin, which carries a maximum penalty of 20 years’ jail. Mr Markarian pleaded guilty and asked that four other offences be taken into account in sentencing. Judge Greg Hosking in the District Court sentenced him to prison for two years and six months, with a non-parole period of 15 months which would have expired in October 2003. Mr Caccamo was sentenced to eight years’ jail with a non-parole period of five years. The Crown appealed, alleging Mr Markarian’s sentence was inadequate.

The CCA allowed the appeal and re-sentenced Mr Markarian to eight years’ jail with a non-parole period of four-and-a-half years. He is eligible for parole in January 2007. The CCA held that the 15-year maximum penalty for an offence involving less than 250 grams should be reduced by a third to 10 years due to Mr Markarian’s lesser role in the drug operation, his plea, the finding of contrition, his addiction, and his progress in drug rehabilitation. The sentence was then reduced by 25 per cent for his plea of guilty to the other four offences. A sentence of 18 months to two years was imposed for these. Mr Markarian then appealed to the High Court.

The High Court held that sentencing judges should exercise as much flexibility in sentencing as would accord with consistency of approach and with the applicable statutory regime. It agreed that sentencing judges should explain the factors in each case which influenced the final sentence. The Court however held that the CCA’s approach of starting with a maximum penalty based on the quantity of the drug alone and then making proportional deductions from it, based on other factors in the case, was not appropriate. The number and complexity of factors which Judge Hosking had had to weigh did not lend themselves to the arithmetical process used by the CCA. A majority of the Court stated that the preferable approach to sentencing is by “instinctive synthesis”, whereby the sentencing judge weighs all the competing factors and arrives at one final sentence, as opposed to an approach whereby the judge quantifies the individual factors leading to a final determination.
 
The Court unanimously allowed the appeal and remitted the matter to the CCA for its reconsideration of the sentence in accordance with its reasons for judgment.

• This statement is not intended to be a substitute for the reasons of the High Court or to be used in any later consideration of the Court’s reasons. Public Information Officer


Friday, July 2, 2004

They're Still At It !


Reporter: Quentin Dempster

Broadcast: 02/07/2004

QUENTIN DEMPSTER: We regret to report that seven years after the Wood Royal Commission found that corruption within the NSW police was entrenched and systemic, nothing much has changed.

This was officially observed this week by the Police Integrity Commission.

Based on an extensive covert surveillance operation called 'Florida', in which a rolled-over police officer gathered devastating evidence of police greenlighting drug distribution, loading, stealing, verballing and assault the PIC has also exposed a failure of police management and supervision.

Worse, it has declared that it will be difficult to change the corrupt police culture.

QUENTIN DEMPSTER: In late 1998, a NSW police officer, code-named M5, rolled over to the State Crime Commission.

He's the one on the right in this surveillance video, handing over money wrapped in a newspaper.

M5 PIC INFORMANT: It was very conflicting in some ways.

Um, you know, there were some things that I was asked to do that I wasn't happy doing.

QUENTIN DEMPSTER: A massive and long-running covert operation was mounted around M5, based initially on the northern beaches of Sydney.

Evidence gathered led to other covert operations involving corrupt conduct and criminality from the late 1980s to 2001.

418 corrupt incidents were identified.

Incredibly, investigators were able to maintain the secrecy of their operations for four years until the first public hearings in October 2001.

This is the list of corrupt and criminal conduct exposed: Soliciting and receiving bribes from drug dealers.

'Greenlighting' drug trafficking .

Stealing cash and property .

Reducing charges in return for payment .

Perverting the course of justice .

Assaulting suspects .

'Verballing' suspects .

'Loading' suspects .

Organising or 'greenlighting' break and enter offences Six police officers have since been convicted.

40 former and 3 serving officers were found to have acted corruptly.

14 of 32 identified serving officers left the police, 11 as a direct result of the investigation.

Nothing's changed with police culture?

SGT BOB PRITCHARD, POLICE ASSOCIATION: Well, in fact, I think there's been a great change since the royal commission days.

People now are more willing to come forward and identify corrupt practices at their workplace.

QUENTIN DEMPSTER: Sergeant Bob Pritchard, 25 years service, is the new president of the 15,000-member NSW Police Association.

What's the union done to help change the corrupt police culture?

SGT BOB PRITCHARD: Well, certainly, we've put it out there, we've changed a number of our rules to ensure that corrupt police, when they're identified, are certainly not supported by the union.

QUENTIN DEMPSTER: You don't give them any legal support?

SGT BOB PRITCHARD: Certainly not where it's identified they have not carried out their job professionally.

We are here to look after honest members.

QUENTIN DEMPSTER: The disturbing aspect of Wood Royal Commission was the declaration that corruption in the NSW Police was entrenched and systemic.

Does that descriptor still apply?

KEN MORONEY, COMMISSIONER OF POLICE: No, I don't believe so.

Is there corrupt activity?

Yes, there is.

Are we seeking to root it out?

Yes, we are.

And I'm not only being supported by the three oversight agencies, I'm being supported by the courts.

By the District Court and by magistrates in local courts.

Because that's the only way we're going to address this issue.

QUENTIN DEMPSTER: When police are prosecuted?

KEN MORONEY: When corruption is identified and police officers are prosecuted.

But the significant change which leads us to that conclusion, or leads me to that conclusion, is the fact that corrupt activity, in its many and varied forms, is in the main identified by other police officers.

And that I see as the most significant change in the culture of the organisation that I have known for almost 40 years.

QUENTIN DEMPSTER: In spite of Commissioner Moroney and Sergeant Pritchard's claims that police culture has changed for the better since the Wood Royal Commission, a question remains.

Why did the Police Integrity Commission make such a pointed reference to police culture in its formal report released just this week, June 2004?

"The issue of culture in a police service is complex.

The Royal Commission identified and commented on many factors that contribute to the negative aspects of police culture.

Those findings need not be repeated.

However, the evidence given in the Operation Florida investigation indicates that there was not an instant transformation of the culture of NSW Police following the Royal Commission and that it will be difficult to bring about such a change."

In 2002, 'Four Corners' reporter Chris Masters secured a rare interview with one of the police exposed through Operation Florida, Detective Sergeant Ray Peattie, convicted and jailed for having accepted bribes.

Mr Peattie reminded us of the cynicism running deep within the culture from the '70s and '80s when he described an officer's interview with a potential recruit for a detectives squad.

RAY PEATTIE, FORMER DETECTIVE ('FOUR CORNERS' 2002): He asked the person if he was prepared to verbal people.

And the bloke said, "Certainly not, sir."

He said, "Are you prepared to bash people to get an admission off them?"

He said, "Certainly not, sir."

"Are you prepared to rob them?"

"No, sir, definitely not."

He said, "Well, what the **** are you coming here for?"

And the bloke said, "Oh, I would, I didn't know what answers.

"I thought that was the answers you wanted."

QUENTIN DEMPSTER: Our political leaders assert that things have changed since the Wood Royal Commission and the corruption exposed through Operation Florida.

But the PIC analysis also pinpointed a contemporary failure of police management and supervision.

Evidence showed that standard operating procedures requiring the video-taping of drug searches under warrant had been ignored.

The police video or exhibit officer meant to follow procedures, in one case, would on the nod from his colleagues, switch the camera off, giving them a chance to trouser a lot of the drug money they found.

"The commission considers that a high trust model of supervision is inadequate and inappropriate for corruption prevention, and that police officers at the operational level must take a greater responsibility for ensuring that corrupt officers are exposed."

SGT BOB PRITCHARD: It shows that in the past there has been a problem with supervision and it shows that where supervision is lax it allows corrupt practice to breed.

And where in fact, and it shows within that Florida report, that where people are supervised properly and there is intrusive supervision, it shows that there is a lesser chance of people carrying out corrupt conduct.

QUENTIN DEMPSTER: Commissioner, do you acknowledge there's been a failure of supervision?

KEN MORONEY: Ah, certainly in Mascot Florida there was.

There was failure at command level.

There was failure in supervision.

And it's important that we learn from these lessons.

I'm not going to hide from the facts.

QUENTIN DEMPSTER: The PIC also questioned the effectiveness of the 24-hour duty officer structure, introduced at great cost to the public of NSW as a managerial watchdog on corrupt police behaviour.

"Evidence was heard that the introduction of this new position might not have achieved this aim.

NSW Police undertook to conduct a review of the position and provided the Commission with the details of that review.

The information provided did not include any details about an evaluation of the position."

KEN MORONEY: The deputy commissioner of operations, David Madden, is currently completing that evaluation.

Subject to that, I would anticipate there will be some further strengthening of that particular role and function.

QUENTIN DEMPSTER: Commissioner, do you feel that you have been called to account on a failure of managerial supervision by the PIC?

KEN MORONEY: Yes.

I've been called to account.

And I have no difficulty in providing that accountability, not only to the Police Integrity Commission but equally as important to the community of NSW.

QUENTIN DEMPSTER: Opposition Police Spokesman Peter Debnam has been complaining for months now about the resourcing of detectives and the level of police management commitment to exposing corruption.

PETER DEBNAM, OPPOSITION POLICE SPOKESMAN: My biggest concern is there is a culture of cover-up still within the Government and NSW Police.

Even on an issue like integrity testing, where I asked last year, "Just give me the numbers for the last three years "on how many you've done," they couldn't even answer that question.

Now, that's a clear message to all NSW Police that they're not going to be honest, they're not going to be transparent in delivering information to the public.

Well, that's what we need to change on day one, introduce transparency, honesty, accountability.

QUENTIN DEMPSTER: Commissioner, are random integrity tests still being carried out?

KEN MORONEY: Yes, they're an important part of our integrity regime as we move towards ensuring that there is ethical conduct in the organisation.

QUENTIN DEMPSTER: Well, why hasn't Mr Debnam been given the figures?

KEN MORONEY: I'm not aware of why that may be the case but I want to reassure the community that we are conducting those tests.

We are conducting investigations, and indeed, there's been a rigorous regime over the last 12 months, in particular, seeking to identify those officers engaged in inappropriate or illegal conduct.

QUENTIN DEMPSTER: How many?

KEN MORONEY: Well, there have been some 60 operations, and a number of those developed into specific integrity tests.

QUENTIN DEMPSTER: There's more bad publicity coming for NSW Police.

The union's already bracing for it.

QUENTIN DEMPSTER: How big a problem is drug use amongst the younger police?

SGT BOB PRITCHARD: Well, certainly it's been identified over the past couple of years as being a problem.

It's being addressed and there is an inquiry currently taking place.

So, until the end of that inquiry, we're still uncertain as to the total extent of that use but certainly, it's admitted there is a problem.

QUENTIN DEMPSTER: Another integrity commission operation, code-named Abelia is looking at the apparently high incidence of recreational drug use -- cannabis, cocaine and amphetamines -- among serving police officers, including criminal supply and distribution networks.

The median age of police officers nowadays is 28.

Where alcoholism was a contributing factor in corrupt police behaviour in the past, it now appears drug use and abuse could be as big, if not a bigger problem.

QUENTIN DEMPSTER: How big's the problem?

KEN MORONEY: Well, that's the purpose of the inquiry, to gauge the extent of the problem, but clearly we do have a problem amongst our police officers.

And it may be indicative that it's representative of the broader problem of elicit drug abuse in the community.

That doesn't bring me any joy but I know full well that I've got to seek to identify those officers who are engaged in that level of misconduct.

Um, I'm working towards that.

I've sent a very clear message to my officers.

In my opening statement to the Commission, I indicated that there is a zero tolerance, on my part, in terms of illicit drug abuse.

Clearly what distinguishes the police officer from the member of the community who might engage in similar sort of conduct is that our officers have an oath of office, they discharge powers of arrest, they are armed, and that, to my mind, brings a greater requirement for compliance on their part.

QUENTIN DEMPSTER: So stand by for evidence of drug-running police officers in charge of guns and high-speed cars.

It seems the community wants to be able to trust the police but that trust is still being betrayed.

Tuesday, June 29, 2004

Police clean-out, but rot goes on

By Malcolm Brown 

Date June 29, 2004

Ten years after a royal commission exposed the corruption extending to the heart of the NSW Police there has been no change in police culture, and any change would be difficult to bring about.
These are the pessimistic findings of the Police Integrity Commission in a report brought down yesterday.

In the end, only six officers have been convicted of criminal offences - David Phillip Patison, Matthew John Jasper, Raymond John Peattie, Shaun Andrew Davidson, David Marshall Hill and Mark William Messenger.

The 532-page PIC report, tabled in State Parliament, found 40 former and three serving officers guilty of misconduct. Substantial allegations also remained against a further 10 former and six serving officers, and five civilians.

All were involved in an investigation, Operation Florida, sparked in 2000 when a drug d
ealer, Luke Michael Benbow, got fed up with being repeatedly ripped off by corrupt police and took legal advice to complain to the State Crime Commission.

Operation Florida focused on the Major Crime Squad North, North Sydney Drug Unit, Gosford Drug Unit and Manly detectives.

It was alleged in the PIC that some of them had solicited and received bribes from drug dealers; organised or "green-lighted" drug trafficking and break-and-enters; stole cash and property; reduced charges in return for payment; perverted the course of justice; and assaulted, verballed and "loaded up" suspects.

Such events came to light only after one officer, code-named M5, told the NSW Crime Commission in 1998 about his corrupt past and offered to trap former colleagues in casual conversation about past events.

One event concerned the operation Let's Dance, where a large amount of drugs and money was recovered at Manly in 1992. It was alleged that more than $100,000 was skimmed off and shared among members of the Major Crime Squad North.

The theft was talked about in hushed but hilarious tones for years and it did not take much effort for M5 to induce his former colleagues after a couple of beers to incriminate themselves, recording their words to confirm his own account to investigators.

But the passage of time and failing memories all counted against working this up into a criminal case that would stand up in court. More relevant evidence related to the former Manly detectives David Phillip Patison and Matthew John Jasper. Both were arrested on December 16, 2000, and the evidence against them had been building since the previous May.

Two drug dealers, Benbow and Vincent Caccamo, who helped investigators expose Patison and
Jasper, were convicted of drug-related offences but received reduced sentences.

Solicitor, Martin Green
A solicitor, Martin Green, by allegedly engaging Benbow in a dubious conversation, was prosecuted on counts of inciting Benbow to bribe Patison and acting with intent to pervert the course of justice.

He was acquitted at trial but the Law Society cancelled his practising certificate.

Those who were not prosecuted gave evidence to the commission under a provision which allowed them to declare that whatever they said, provided it was truthful, could not be used against them in civil or criminal proceedings.

Because a lot of the evidence related to events dating back as far as 1991, it was hard to get corroborative evidence that might have led to a successful criminal conviction. But there was sufficient evidence for misconduct findings.

The commission recommended tightening of police procedures in several areas, including the execution of search warrants and supervision. Police had initiated their own reforms in other areas.

John Brogden
On the handling and storage of exhibits, the PIC noted that specific procedures existed in the 1990s but there was a failure of compliance and supervision.

The Opposition Leader, John Brogden, said he was concerned at the small number of charges "despite findings of misconduct against many, many police".

Mr Brogden feared the PIC lacked the will to follow individual matters through to charges. "We're finding that our watchdogs are becoming political lapdogs in NSW," he said.

The Police Minister, John Watkins, said only that he had a copy of the report and had referred it to the Police Commissioner, Ken Moroney, for a further report.

Wednesday, March 3, 2004

Operation Least Said WA connection to Operation Florida NSW

Extract from Hansard [ASSEMBLY - Wednesday, 3 March 2004]

p283c-284a

Mr Colin Barnett; Dr Geoff Gallop; Mr Rob Johnson; Speaker

[1] POLICE ROYAL COMMISSION REPORT, REFERENCE TO SIGNIFICANT AND SUSTAINED CORRUPTION AND CRIMINAL CONDUCT

16. Mr C.J. BARNETT to the Premier:

I refer the Premier to his ministerial statement in this House yesterday regarding the 1053-page report of the Royal Commission Into "Whether There Has Been Any Corrupt or Criminal Conduct by Western Australian Police Officers", in which he stated that the report found the following -

. . . there has been significant and sustained corruption and criminal conduct in the Western Australia Police Service since 1985;
  • (1) Can the Premier point to the page of the royal commission report that says there is significant and sustained corruption in the WA Police Service?
  •  
  • (2) Given that only two out of 5 000 WA police officers have been charged as a result of the police royal commission, will the Premier now admit he is smearing the entire Police Service in an attempt to justify his expenditure of $28 million of taxpayers’ funds?

Dr G.I. GALLOP replied:

(1)-(2)
The Liberal Party learns nothing. Western Australian history rolls by, and members opposite learn absolutely nothing about what is needed to improve our society. In fact, the definition of Western Australian liberalism is complacency. The Liberals sweep these things under the carpet, as they did for eight years. I ask the Leader of the Opposition a question: are there quotation marks around those two words? That is point one. Point two: anybody who reads those two volumes would reach no other conclusion.

The first page of the report says that the evidence shows that the full range of corrupt or criminal
conduct in the Western Australia Police Service is in line with similar findings by other commissions in Australia.

Mr M.J. Birney: What does that mean?

Dr G.I. GALLOP: What do you think it means, my friend? The report then goes on to show that that occurred over a long period. A substantial proportion of the cases occurred a number of years ago, but there was a continuing problem in the service. Indeed, the royal commission expressed concern that a number of the officers who participated in this conduct and who not only refused to admit it, but also uniformly denied it with vehemence, remain in the WA Police Service.

Regarding the evidence in the Operation Least Said segment dealing with the period from 1985 to 2003, the royal commission said that it demonstrated a continuing pattern of police misconduct throughout that period that had proceeded largely unimpeded and unpunished by the investigative practices in place during that time.

Point of Order

Mr R.F. JOHNSON: The Premier is obviously reading from an official document. I ask that he table that document.

The SPEAKER: It does not appear to be an official document.

Mr R.F. Johnson: He’s quoting from it.

The SPEAKER: Members can quote from their notes during question time.

Questions without Notice Resumed

Dr G.I. GALLOP: If assaults, perjury, drug dealing, and improper disclosure of confidential information is not significant, what is? Does the Leader of the Opposition regard that to be significant malpractice? Is it criminal behaviour? Of course it is. I also point out to the Leader of the Opposition that this behaviour continues. In fact, it continues to happen right up to today; so much so that the police royal commission stated that “. . . internal investigations . . . were clearly unsatisfactory.” What is of more significance is the extent to which the WA Police Service has been ineffective in monitoring these events and modifying its procedures to deal with that conduct and to prevent its repetition. The only person in Western Australia incapable of reading the royal commission report is the Leader of the Opposition. He is in a party that covered up these matters for eight years when in government.

In conclusion, the Leader of the Opposition also said in his response to my speech that I used the word “systemic”. I have never used that word in that regard. There was a good discussion of this issue at the press conference yesterday, at which we specifically said that the situation in Western  serious, continuing and sustained, but not systemic. I call on the Leader of the Opposition to take away those comments from the public debate because they are not true. It is indicative of a continuing pattern in which the Leader of the Opposition says anything about anything to try to make a political point. Inevitably, what he says is not true. His credibility is on the line in relation to this issue.

Tuesday, January 27, 2004

Operation Florida The West Australian Connection


 




The conduct described in the previous chapter dealing with the evidence obtained in Operation Least Said revealed improper practices of general application among certain detectives of the Western Australia Police Service (“WAPS”) from 1985 until the early 1990s.

Those practices, which included the fabrication of evidence and perjury, were similar to those revealed by police corruption inquiries elsewhere, including the Wood Royal Commission (1997) in New South Wales, which commenced in the mid 1990s. It would therefore not be unreasonable to expect that there could be a risk of corrupt practices being employed in cases in which members of both Police Services operated together.

Evidence obtained by the Royal Commission showed that risk to be real.

In public hearings the Royal Commission heard evidence to the effect that officers of the Western Australia and New South Wales Police Services combined resources to fabricate evidence. One of the allegations arose out of the extradition of a prisoner from Western Australia to New South Wales in 1987. The other involved the extradition of a prisoner from the United States of America to Western Australia via New South Wales in 1989. The twoters are quite separate, but similar in that, in both instances, it is alleged that verbal admissions were fabricated in order to strengthen the cases against the prisoners.

The investigation was based upon information provided to the Royal Commission by the  Police Integrity Commission (“PIC”) in New South Wales as a result of its Operation Florida. In 1998, a member of the New South Wales Police Service started to co-operate with the New South Wales Crime Commission (“NSWCC”). In the weeks that followed, this officer embarked upon a process of debriefing, during which he revealed many instances of corrupt conduct in which he had been a participant with others. This officer, in co-operation with the NSWCC, continued in his duties as a police officer for a period of twelve months, during which time he had a number of conversations with colleagues that were recorded. In particular, a number of incriminating conversations with a colleague were recorded. Some of the recorded conversations were later led in evidence in the PIC hearings. The police officer and his colleague were referred to in the Royal Commission as F2 and F1
respectively.

During the course of his debriefing process, F2 nominated the 1989 extradition matter as one in which misconduct had occurred. As investigations continued, and further information